A Paper Trail for Voters
This editorial was originally published in The New
York Times on December 8, 2003.
Ever since the voting trauma in Florida three years ago, election
officials have been trying to find a better way to cast and count
ballots. As progress is beginning to be made, it is critical that
the new strategies do not create as many problems as they solve.
With the help of $3.9 billion in federal funds set aside to improve
elections, states have begun the move to electronic voting machines.
The new A.T.M.-style machines are easier for most people to use
and undeniably faster. But recent glitches in Virginia and Florida
have revived questions about how to recount a computerized vote
after a close or suspicious election. New machines can already print
a total of all votes cast, but that is simply a reflection of the
computerized tally. What is needed is a paper record of each voter's
choices that the voter can verify.
The most reasonable answer is to require that the machines be equipped
with printers that will produce what Representative Rush Holt, Democrat
of New Jersey, calls a "parallel paper record" of the
vote. That makes sense to us. Like deeds, diplomas and other vital
public documents, the nation's votes still need to be preserved
somewhere on paper.
This view has drawn a lot of criticism, particularly from companies
that make electronic voting machines. They say that adding a paper
trail will cost more and that the printers will complicate the maintenance
of the machines. Mainly, however, the machines' supporters say no
fail-safe system is necessary because the machines are extremely
secure.
Companies like Diebold Election Systems, which is one of the largest
manufacturers of computerized voting machines, have not done their
case much good by getting involved in politics. Walden O'Dell, the
chief executive of Diebold Inc., is an ardent Republican fund-raiser
who has committed to "helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes"
to President Bush in next year's election. Such comments naturally
fuel concern, especially among Democrats who note that Ohio is an
important swing state in presidential elections and that machines
from Mr. O'Dell's operation are among those being considered as
new voting technology across the country.
Even without conspiracy theories, however, election experts from
both parties worry that all these A.T.M.-style voting machines are
not adequately protected against an advanced computer geek aiming
to scramble the votes or a political hack turned political hacker.
California last month took the lead in demanding a backup paper
tally of the vote when Secretary of State Kevin Shelley ordered
that by July 2006, all electronic screen voting machines must have
a "voter verified paper audit trail." Since California
is expected to spend about $400 million on its new machines, the
big voting machine companies are scrambling to make the paper options
available and workable.
California's push also may make it easier for other states that
are still circling the voting machine issue. New York is way behind,
as Albany's politicians prefer to direct their attention to the
more pleasant question of who gets the big new contracts for voting
equipment. But New Yorkers — especially New York City voters
— need the assurance that their votes are available on paper
for the recounting. Too many elections teeter on a few hundred votes,
and candidates rightly expect human beings to be able to double-check
the results. America's election apparatus needs to move firmly and
quickly into the computer age. But the public must feel secure that
each vote is really counted. At this stage, a voter-verified paper
trail offers the public that necessary security."
© 2003 The NewYork Times
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